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Abstract: Should pure economic loss be compensated in China? If so, to what
extent? Both questions are left unsolved in the established literature. We contri-
bute to the existing literature by showing that the Chinese courts have developed
a relatively conservative attitude towards the compensation of pure economic loss
and that the arguments adopted by the courts to deny recovery are neither fair nor
reasonable. Using the law and economics analysis, we have recourse to four com-
plementary solutions. First, pure economic loss cases involving socially relevant
losses should be compensated. Second, when social losses are not involved, pure
economic loss should also be compensated if the third parties are willing to pay or
have paid for protection against such a loss. Third, to relieve the excessive pres-
sure imposed by the compensation for such loss, the concepts of causation and
the duty of the victim to mitigate damage need to be further clarified in Chinese
laws. Fourth, when determining the amount of compensation for pure economic
loss, we should carefully balance the trade-off among a variety of factors, includ-
ing the extent to which the damage could have been foreseen, the nature of the
loss, the blameworthiness of the tortfeasor, the size of the plaintiff class, the pub-
lic policy toward professional standards, the victim’s private loss, the social loss,
the courts’ capacities to calculate the loss, and the third parties’ willingness to
pay for protection against the loss.
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I Introduction
Pure economic loss refers to a financial loss that a person suffers, without accom-
panying harm to their health or property.1 In this respect, pure economic loss is
different from consequential economic loss, which is usually connected with
(even the slightest) damage to the victim or their property.2 Consequential eco-
nomic loss is normally recoverable because it presupposes the existence of physi-
cal injuries. By contrast, pure economic loss only strikes the victim’s wallet and
nothing else. Therefore, it is still open for debate whether, and if so to what ex-
tent, the recovery of pure economic loss should be allowed.
Given the nature of pure economic loss, there is substantial variance across
different legal systems regarding the extent to which pure economic loss in tort
can be recovered. For instance, in Europe, a distinction can usually be made
among liberal regimes (ie Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain), conservative
regimes (ie Austria, Finland, Germany, Portugal and Sweden), and pragmatic re-
gimes (ie England, Scotland, and the Netherlands).3 The liberal regimes often
deal with pure economic loss autonomously in tort and they are characterised by
the principle absence of any objection to compensate pure economic loss.4 On the
contrary, in the conservative regimes, pure economic loss does not belong to the
‘absolute rights’ which receive protection under tort law.5 If a remedy is avail-
able, it will either be based on a specific tort provision or on an expansive appli-
cation of contract principles.6 Therefore, the liberal regimes start from an inclu-
sive position that allows the recovery of pure economic loss in principle, whereas
the conservative regimes start from an exclusive position that denies the recovery
1 This definition is given by C van Dam, European Tort Law (2nd edn 2013) 208.
2 The difference between pure economic loss and consequential economic loss is discussed by
many scholars. See among many othersWH van Boom, Pure Economic Loss: A Comparative Per-
spective, in:WHvanBoom/H Koziol/C Witting (eds), PureEconomicLoss (2004) 1; andM Bussani/
VV Palmer, The notion of pure economic loss and its setting, in: M Bussani/VV Palmer (eds), Pure
Economic Loss in Europe (2003) 3.
3 The division is made by Bussani and Palmer. SeeM Bussani/VV Palmer, The liability regimes of
Europe– their façadesand interiors, in:M Bussani/VV Palmer (eds),PureEconomicLoss inEurope
(2003) 120. These authors also realised that the division is a highly condensed summary reflecting
the individual national legislative style, but it is incomprehensible, as each country’s liability re-




Pure Economic Loss in China 287
in the first place.7 For the practical regimes, unlike the liberal and conservative
regimes, the recovery of pure economic loss is neither driven by a wide tort prin-
ciple nor by a checklist of absolute rights.8 Instead, the pragmatic regimes are
characterised by a cautious case-by-case approach, which carefully considers the
actual socio-economic implications of allowing compensation for pure economic
loss (principally via ‘the duty of care’ concept).9
When it comes to China, the concept of pure economic loss was not suffi-
ciently recognised, neither among policymakers nor by academics before the
2000s. Although there is no solid evidence to support this fact, we do observe
that, in practice, the recovery of pure economic loss was rarely approved by tort
law before the 2000s.10 From the start of the 21st century, there has been an in-
creasing number of cases in China which involved the recovery of pure economic
loss.11 Also, since that time, the issue of the recovery of pure economic loss has
7 See M Bussani/VV Palmer, General conclusions of the study, in: M Bussani/VV Palmer (eds),
Pure Economic Loss in Europe (2003) 531.
8 See Bussani/Palmer (fn 3) 124.
9 For example, in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, judges normally use three different but
overlapping tests (the ‘Caparo’ test, the ‘Hedley Byrne’ test, and the ‘incremental’ approach) to
decidewhether to imposeadutyof care on thedefendant in claims that involvepure economic loss.
To establish the duty of care under the ‘Caparo’ test, harmmust be foreseeable, the plaintiff and the
defendantmust be in a relationshipof proximity, and itmust be fair, just, and reasonable to impose
liability– see Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 Appeal Cases (AC) 605. To establish the duty
of careunder the ‘HedleyByrne’ test, the tortfeasor shouldhaveassumedresponsibility towards the
victim, and the victimhas to rely reasonably on that assumptionof responsibility (seeHedleyByrne
& Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465). Last, the so-called ‘incremental’ approach, which is
derived from the Caparo case, directs the courts to develop novel categories of negligence analogi-
callywith the established one. For a critical review of all these tests and suggestions for reform, see
PJ Yap, Pure Economic Loss and Defects in the Law of Negligence (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 99, 80–99;
and K Barker, Wielding Occam’s Razor: Pruning Strategies for Economic Loss (2006) 26 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies (OJLS) 289, 289–302.
10 When searching the keyword ‘pure economic loss’ in ChinaLawInfo (the largest online data-
base on Chinese cases), we could find 168 cases related to this issue, all of which were dealt with
by courts after 2000. The search results via the ChinaLawInfo also show that, before 2006, only two
pure economic loss caseswere closedby courts (one in 2005 andone in 2006). However, after 2006,
the number of pure economic loss cases had increased to 166 by the date of our last access (on
16 December 2020).
11 For example, one study pointed out that, in the 1990s, the issue of ‘pure economic loss’ did not
attract much attention, either from the legislator or from academic scholars. See YS Ge, Chuncui
Jingji Sunshi de Peichang Yu Yiban Qinquan Xingwei Tiaokuan [The Recoverability of Pure Eco-
nomic Loss and the General Provisions of Tort], 21 Peking University Law Journal (Peking Univ LJ)
(2009) 689, 710 f.
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gradually drawn the attention of Chinese legal scholars. Nowadays, it is com-
monly accepted that art 106 of the 1987 General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL)12
and art 2 of the 2010 Tort Liability Law (TLL)13 can be interpreted as the general
bases for protecting pure economic loss in China.14 According to art 106 of the
GPCL,
...where a citizen or legal person through fault interferes with and causes damage to state or
collective property, or to the property or person of another, he/she must bear civil liability.
Art 2 of the TLL further explains,
...civil rights and interests... include the right to life, the right to health, the right to name,
the right to reputation, the right to honour, right to self-image, right of privacy, marital
autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest, copyright, patent right, ex-
clusive right to use a trademark, right to discovery, equities, right of succession, and other
personal and property rights and interests.
Taking these two articles together, it seems that Chinese tort law protects not only
breaches of the so-called ‘absolute rights’, but also breaches of ‘other personal
and property rights and interests.’15 In other words, these articles seem to have a
broad coverage, and do not appear to exclude the recovery of pure economic loss.
Therefore, if one only considers these articles, China might be classified as one of
the liberal regimes. However, in practice, Chinese courts still take a conservative
12 The GPCL is considered as the basic law (jiben falü) on civil matters. More information of the
GPCL and its significance can be found at LH Zhang, Latest Developments in the Codification of
Chinese Civil Law (2008) 83 Tulane L Rev 999, 999–1039. This Law came into effect in 1987 and is
still valid. An English translation of the GPCL is also provided byW Gray/HR Zheng, General Prin-
ciples of Civil Lawof the People’s Republic of China (1986) 34 TheAmerican Journal of Comparative
Law (AJCL) 715, 715–743. However, it should be noted that the Chinese legislator did not take the
protection of pure economic loss into account when drafting art 106 of the GPCL. See XB Zhang/
XY Zhang, Lunchuncui Jingji Sunshi de Jige Jiben Wenti [On Several Basic Problems about Pure
Economic Loss] (2007) 7 Law ScienceMagazine 15, 18.
13 The TLL is promulgated by the Standing Committee of the NPC and came into effect on 1 July
2010.
14 This argument is made by LM Wang, Qinquanfa Yiban Tiaokuan de Baohu Fanwei [The Scope
of Protection byGeneral Provision in Tort Law] (2009) 3 The Jurist 19. See alsoGe, 21 PekingUniv LJ
(2009) 689, 699–711; and XB Zhang, Legislation of Tort Liability Law in China (2018) 159–178. Note
that, the GPCL and the TLLwill be abrogated as of 1 January 2021. Nevertheless, both art 106 of the
GPCL and art 2 of the TLL are adopted by arts 1165 and 990 of the new Civil Code in China respec-
tively. The contents of these articles remains almost unchanged.
15 See Zhang (fn 14) 159–178.
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approach and recovery of pure economic loss is largely restricted.16 In fact, over
the last two decades, legal scholars, courts, and legislators in China have been
facing increasing challenges related to the recoverability of pure economic
loss.17 The following questions continuously arise, for example, about the extent
to which, and in what ways, pure economic interests should be protected in
China. Are there any effective frameworks for dealing with pure economic loss?
Before answering these questions, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
current situation in China with respect to the recoverability of pure economic
loss. It is also necessary to investigate the challenges faced by Chinese courts
in practice. Only then can we propose some guidelines for the future that might
be helpful to Chinese legislators.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the various approaches
taken by Chinese courts when dealing with the recovery of different pure econom-
ic loss cases. Section III briefly summarises the results of the case studies. Sectio-
n IV critically evaluates the arguments for the exclusion of pure economic loss
provided by Chinese courts. Section V concludes and provides several policy re-
commendations.
II Typical pure economic loss cases in China
The legal basis for recovering pure economic loss in China seems to be very gen-
eral, causing difficulties in attaining a complete understanding of the recoverabil-
ity of pure economic loss in practice. To remedy this, we should, in particular, pay
attention to pure economic loss cases in addition to the doctrinal rules. Certain
elements in those cases, such as general propositions, definitions, reasons and
holdings, should also be discussed.
In this section, we analyse several pure economic loss cases in China. These
cases are fairly typical, because most of them are guiding cases (zhidao anli) that
are chosen by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC).18 They are of great importance,
16 This restrictive approach is also observed by many Chinese scholars. See among many others
Zhang (fn 14) 143; andGe, 21 Peking Univ LJ (2009) 689, 699–711.
17 More discussion on the problems faced by Chinese courts and scholars in practice can be found
in Zhang (fn 14) 459–473 andGe, 21 Peking Univ LJ (2009) 689, 699–711.
18 To make the judgments more consistent, the SPC launched the Guiding Case System (GCS) in
2010. Now, the GCS is regulated by the 2010 Provisions Concerning SPC’s Work on Case Guidance.
Under theGCS, eachyear theSPCwill select andpublishseveral representative casesas theGuiding
Cases. Such a system was further specified in the 2015 Detailed Rules of Implementation of the
Provisions of the SupremePeople’s Court on CaseGuidanceWork.More information on theGCS, as
well as its scope of authority and its adoption and importance in practice, is provided by J Mark,
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as lower courts should ‘refer to’ (canzhao) these guiding cases when handling
cases with similar facts. As a result, these selected cases may provide a ‘snapshot’
of the recoverability of pure economic loss in China.
Generally speaking, pure economic loss cases in China can be classified into
five categories: 1) the unfair competition case; 2) the flawed provision of profes-
sional services or advice case; 3) the interference with business case; 4) the cable
case, and 5) the transferred loss case.19 The following subsections will discuss
these cases respectively.
A Case One: unfair competition
In Ju County Winery v Wendeng Brewery Factory,20 the defendant used the trade-
mark ‘qifengjiu’ (identical to that of the plaintiff) on its wine, causing sales of the
plaintiff to decrease. The defendant was judged to have violated the plaintiff’s
exclusive right to trademark by the court of first instance. Based on these
grounds, the court deemed that the defendant should be liable to pay compensa-
tion for the plaintiff’s loss of profits. However, the court of appeal disagreed with
the reasoning given by the court of first instance. According to the court of appeal,
the defendant’s act was misleading rather than infringing the plaintiff’s exclusive
right to trademark. It then stated that arts 4, 5 and 7 of the GPCL should be the
Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform (2016) 129 Harvard L Rev 2213, 2213–
2234; and M Zhang, Pushing the Envelope: Application of Guiding Cases in Chinese Courts and
Development of Case Law in China (2017) 26 Washington International Law Journal 269, 269–306.
Background information on the conditions under which the GCS emerged and evolved is provided
by SC Wang, Guiding Cases as a Form of Statutory Interpretation: Expansion of Supreme People’s
Court’s Judicial Lawmaking Authority in China (2019) 48 Hong Kong Law Journal (HKLJ) 1067,
1067–1096.
19 Even though our classification does not include all cases that involve pure economic loss, our
interest lies in tracing themost recurrent patterns,whichwe refer to as the ‘typical cases’. Note that
a different classification is given in the existing literature. For example, Bussani&Palmer hold that
the typical instances of pure economic loss include four different cases: the ‘ricochet loss’ case, the
‘transferred loss’ case, the ‘closure of public markets, transportation corridors and public infra-
structures’ case, and the ‘reliance upon flawed data, advice or professional services’ case. SeeBus-
sani/Palmer (fn 3) 10–13.VanBoom (fn 2) 6 f bycontrast, focuseson theparties involved in thecases
and divides the cases into two groups: the ‘two party pure economic loss’ case and the ‘three party
economic loss’ case.
20 See Ju County Winery v Wendeng Brewery Factory (Juxian jiuchang v Wendeng niangjiuchang
buzhengdang jingzheng jiufen’an) (2 January 1990) Shandong SPC (Court of Second Instance).
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correct legal bases for the defendant to pay compensation.21 These articles read as
follows:
Art 4: ‘In civil activities, the principles of offering of one’s own free will, fairness, making
compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be observed.’
Art 5: ‘The lawful civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons shall be protected by
law; no organisation or individual may infringe upon them.’
Art 7: ‘Civil activities shall have respect for social ethics and shall not harm the public inter-
est, undermine State economic plans or disrupt the social economic order.’
Judges from the court of appeal considered that the defendant had not acted with
honesty and credibility, had disrupted the social economic order, and infringed
the ‘lawful interests’ of the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant should be liable to pay
for the loss of profits sustained by the plaintiff. Moreover, judges from the court of
appeal also realised that, even though the anti-unfair competition law had not
been promulgated at the time when this case occurred, this case was essentially
a case of unfair competition. In 1993, the 1993 Law Against Unfair Competition
was enacted. Now, arts 6 and 17 of this Law clearly state that a business operator
might be entitled to claim compensation of pure economic loss (ie the loss of prof-
its) from his/her competitor if the competitor interfered with his/her business
through unfair competition.22
B Case Two: flawed professional advice and services
Cases of flawed professional advice and services concern the liability of those
who provide professional advice, prepare data or render services. Intentionally or
carelessly drafted advice or statements could cause damage to the contractual
counterparty. For example, in Chen Lihua et al v Daqing Lianyi Company & Shenyin
21 The court of first instance used art 3 of the 1983 Trademark Law and art 118 of the GPCL as the
main legal bases for granting compensation to the plaintiff. The former article states, ‘... the trade-
mark registrants shall enjoy the exclusive right to use the trademarks, andbeprotectedby law.’The
latter article states, ‘if... the rights to exclusive use of trademarks are infringed upon by suchmeans
as plagiarism, alteration or imitation, they shall have the right to demand that the infringement be
stopped, its ill effects be eliminated and the damages be compensated for.’
22 The 1993 Law Against Unfair Competition was not promulgated by the Standing Committee of
the NPC until 2 September 1993. This lawwas then amended on 4 November 2017.
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Securities Company,23 the defendant made a false statement by overstating its net
profits, which was not discovered by a securities underwriter. As a result, Chen
Linhua and the other twenty-two persons who invested in the defendant’s stock
suffered significant losses. The court of first instance held that the defendant
should be liable to pay for the investors’ losses, on the basis of art 21 of the 1993
Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks24 and
art 27 of the 2003 Some Provisions of the SPC on Trying Cases of Civil Compensa-
tion Arising from False Statements in the Securities Market.25 According to the
court, the defendant knowingly and deliberately made the false statement and the
investors’ losses were causally related to this false statement. The defendant ap-
pealed to a higher court, arguing that the investors’ losses were not caused by its
false statement but by the systemic risks of the stock market. However, the higher
court rejected the appeal, because the defendant did not provide sufficient evi-
dence to prove the causal link between the systemic risks in the stock market and
the investors’ losses.
Liability for conduct induced by the over-valuation of a company also arises
in other cases. For instance, in one case, the plaintiff relied on an audit report that
carelessly over-stated the net financial value of the defendant and signed a sales
agreement with the defendant whose financial situation was actually very poor.26
As a result, the defendant was not in a position to perform their contractual duties
and responsibilities, causing losses to the plaintiff. Moreover, in this case, a bank
was found to have negligently issued a false proof of deposit to a travel agency.
Based on this proof of deposit, an accounting firm carelessly issued the erroneous
audit report. Because of all these facts, the court decided that the travel agency as
23 See Chenlihua dengershisan ming touziren v Daqing lianyi gongsi & Shenyin zhengquan gongsi
xujia chenshu qinquan peichang jiufen’an (Chen Lihua et al v Daqing Lianyi Company & Shenyin Se-
curities Company) (21 December 2004) Helong Jiang SPC (Court of Second Instance).
24 Art 21 states, ‘... in contracting for underwriting, the securities management organisations
should verify the truthfulness, accuracy andcompletenessof theprospectus andother relatedpub-
licitymaterials. If the documents are found to contain false and seriouslymisleading statements or
major omissions, they should not issue an invitation or offers. If the offers have been issued, the
selling activities must be stopped immediately and at the same time remedial measures shall be
taken.’
25 Art 27 states, ‘...wherea securitiesunderwriter, a person recommending the listingof securities
or a professional intermediation service organisation who knows or ought to know the issuer’s or
listed company’s false statement, but does not correct it or issue reserved opinions, his behaviour
shall constitute a joint tort, and he shall bear joint liability for the losses caused to the investors.’
26 See Nanfang Hangkong Lüyou Gongsi v Yulong Lüxingshe deng Daixiao Hetong Jiufen’an (China
SouthernAirlinesTravel &Tourists Company vYulongTravelAgency et al) (20 November 1998) Inter-
im People’s Court of Haikou (Court of Second Instance).
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well as the bank and the accountant were jointly and severally liable to compen-
sate the plaintiff’s damage. This decision was mainly based on the provisions of
art 106 of the GPCL and two judicial replies that were issued by the SPC.27
Moreover, defectively rendered advice and services could also cause damage
to others besides the direct contractual counterparty. For example, inWang Baofu
v Beijing Sanxin Law Firm,28 Wang Shouzhi wanted his son, Wang Baofu (the
plaintiff), to inherit his estate. Wang Shouzhi prepared a will by himself and
signed a contract with Sanxin Law Firm. According to the contract, the law firm
should serve as a witness to Wang Shouzhi’s will. However, Wang Shouzhi’s will
was frustrated by a number of errors. For example, Wang Shouzhi forgot to write
down the date and the law firm only assigned one attorney to perform the task.29
As a result, Wang Shouzhi’s son (the plaintiff) could only inherit a part of the
estate instead of the entire estate that his father had intended to leave him. The
plaintiff thus sued the law firm to claim compensation for the damage incurred.
The court of first instance decided that the law firm should be liable for the
plaintiff’s damage on the basis of the provisions of art 106 of the GPCL, according
to which, anyone who can prove that an attorney was at fault in causing damage
should be entitled to recover their losses. Moreover, the court further held that the
aim of the contract between the plaintiff’s father and the law firm was to ‘guaran-
tee the validity of the will (through the attorney’s expert knowledge), so that the
plaintiff could inherit the whole estate successfully.’ However, in this case, the law
firm did not perform this professional duty appropriately, resulting in damage to
the plaintiff. Thus, the law firm should be liable for the damage it negligently
caused.
27 See 1997 Reply of the SPC on How to Divide the Loss Suffered by Multiple Creditors Among
Verification Organisations, which was issued by the SPC on 31 December 1997. See also the 1998
Reply of the SPC on the Liability of Accounting Firms If They Issued a False Capital Verification
Certificate to Enterprises, which was issued by the SPC on 26 June 1998. Another legal basis for the
recovery of pure economic loss caused by a flawed accounting service is provided by art 42 of the
1993 Law on Certificated Public Accountants, which was issued by the Standing Committee of the
NPC on 31 October 1993. This article states that, ‘if a public accounting firm has in violation of the
provisions of this Law caused losses to its client or other interested parties, it shall bear the liability
for compensation according to law.’However, since this article seems to be very general, it was not
used by the court in China Southern Airlines Travel & Tourists Company v Yulong Travel Agency et al
(fn 26).
28 SeeWangbaofu v Sanxin lüshi shiwusuo caichan sunhai peichang jiufen’an (WangBaofu vBeijing
Sanxin LawFirm) (1 December 2004) BeijingNo 2 InterimPeople’s Court (Trial of Second Instance).
29 Art 17 of the 1985 Lawof Succession in China requires, ‘... a will written on behalf of the testator
shall bewitnessedby twoormorewitnesses, ofwhomonewrites thewill, dates it and signs it along
with the other witness or witnesses andwith the testator...’
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The law firm filed an appeal to a higher court, arguing that they should not be
liable to compensate the plaintiff’s loss. The appeal was not supported by the
higher court. However, the explanations that the higher court gave were slightly
different from those given by the court of first instance. More specifically, the
higher court’s decision was mainly based on the first paragraph of art 49 of the
1996 Lawyers Law,30 rather than art 106 of the GPCL. According to the former ar-
ticle,
...where a lawyer engages in legal practice in violation of law or causes losses to a party due
to his fault, the law firm where the lawyer works shall bear the liability for compensation.
After paying compensation, the law firm may claim recovery from the lawyer who acted
intentionally or out of gross negligence.
In the meantime, the higher court has stated that it was not wrong for the court of
first instance to apply art 106 of the GPCL. Apparently, this case of poor legal
services shows that third parties may suffer pure economic loss when they rely on
services or advice that are carelessly provided by experts.
C Case Three: interference with business
In Shanghai Lanqi Telecommunication Equipment Co, Ltd v Shanghai Yangpu Digi-
tal Market Management Co, Ltd, the plaintiff rented a shop (which is owned by the
defendant) to sell mobile phones.31 On 25 May 2005, the plaintiff signed a sales
contract with a third party, Shanghai Baina Office Equipment Co, Ltd. Under this
contract, the plaintiff was required to deliver 2,000 mobile phones (worth CNY 1.6
million, EUR 240,000) on 29 May. Moreover, if these mobile phones could not be
delivered on time, the plaintiff would be charged 15 %of the contract value on the
basis of the liquidated damages clause in the contract. However, on 29 May, the
defendant prevented the plaintiff frommoving the mobile phones out of the shop,
because the plaintiff had not paid the rent on time. As a result of the defendant’s
act, the plaintiff was unable to send these mobile phones to its customer on time
and was required to pay liquidated damages to its customer.
30 The 1996 Lawyer’s Law in China was enacted by the Standing Committee of the NPC. It was
amended three times afterwards, in 2007, 2012, and 2017.
31 See Shanghai lanqi dianxun shebei youxian gongsi v Shanghai yangpu saibo shuma shichang
jingying guanli youxian gongsi qinhan qiye jingyingquan jiufen’an (Shanghai Lanqi Telecommunica-
tion Equipment Co, Ltd v Shanghai YangpuDigitalMarketManagement Co, Ltd) (23 December 2005)
No 2 Interim People’s Court of Shanghai (Court of Second Instance).
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The plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming compensation for its payment of
liquidated damages. The court of first instance rejected the plaintiff’s claim, based
on the reason that the plaintiff did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the
defendant intended to cause its loss. However, a higher court approved the plain-
tiff’s claim, on the basis of arts 5 and 106 of the GPCL. According to the higher
court, the debated issues are whether the defendant had intended to cause the
plaintiff’s damage and whether the plaintiff’s losses were causally linked to the
defendant’s act. In this case, the court first stated that the plaintiff’s right to oper-
ate a business is protected by law. It then held that the defendant could have
foreseen the plaintiff’s urgent need to deliver phones on time and thus have fore-
seen the plaintiff’s loss, because the plaintiff had previously contacted the defen-
dant on many occasions and had even called the police to prevent the defendant’s
act. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the defendant should be liable
to compensate the plaintiff’s loss, since the former intended to cause the loss and
a causal link existed between his act and the plaintiff’s loss.32 It seems that the
court used two criteria to examine the defendant’s intent: first, whether the defen-
dant infringed a legally protected right or interest with intent; second, whether
the defendant could have foreseen the particular damage.
By contrast, if the defendant negligently rather than intentionally infringes the
plaintiff’s right to operate a business, they may not be liable to compensate the
pure economic damage suffered by the plaintiff. One illustrative example is Yong-
kang Liangda Electronics Factory v Yongang Ruiying Industry and Trade et al.33 In
this case, the plaintiff’s claim for the loss of production was also rejected by the
court, based on arts 106 and 117 of the GPCL. The reason given by the court was
that the plaintiff’s loss was actually a loss of expected profit, which is uncertain in
nature. The plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to prove that such a loss
could be anticipated.
32 In another case, Liu Junfa v Liu Liumei deng qinquan zeren jiufen (Liu Junfa v Liu Liumei et al)
(23 May 2017) Shaoguang Interim People’s Court (Court of Second Instance), the defendant inten-
tionally blocked the entrance to the plaintiff’s pig farm, causing the plaintiff to lose a considerable
amount of profits. The plaintiff’s claim for the loss of profits was also supported by the court.
33 See Yongkangshi liangda wujin dianqichang geren duzi qiye v Yongkangshi ruiying gongmao
youxian gongsi deng caichan sunhai peichang jiufen’an (Yongkang Liangda Electronics Factory v
Yongang Ruiying Industry and Trade et al) (26 September 2016) Jinkang Interim People’s Court
(Court of Second Instance). In this case, a cable in the defendant’s shop caught fire. The fire rapidly
spread to the plaintiff’s premises, causing loss of some property and production.
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D Case Four: cable cases
In Chongqing Minzu Hospital v Chongqing Yong’an Construction Co, Ltd et al, em-
ployees of Yong’an Construction Company negligently cut through a cable be-
longing to a State-owned power company that supplied electricity to Minzu Hos-
pital.34 The unexpected power cut lasted twenty-six hours. At trial, the plaintiff
argued that normally the daily operating revenue of the hospital was approxi-
mately CNY 60,000 (EUR 9,000) on average. However, during the power cut, the
daily operating revenue declined to CNY 13,246 (EUR 1,987). At trial, the plaintiff’s
claim for compensation of lost profits was approved by the court of first instance,
but the amount of compensation was reduced to CNY 25,000 (EUR 3,750). The
legal basis here was art 60 of the 1996 Electric Power Law,35 which states, ‘electric
power enterprises that cause consumers or a third party damage with fault (guocuo)
shall bear liability for compensation according to law.’36
However, the court of second instance quashed the judgment reached by the
court of first instance. The reasons that they gave deserve our attention. First, they
made it clear that ‘pure economic loss refers to the financial loss suffered by a per-
son, with no damage to person or property.’ The court then stated that ‘such loss
should generally not be recovered; one exception is that such loss was caused by the
defendant’s intention.’
Secondly, the court of second instance also held that ‘tort law cannot protect
all rights and interests equally and these rights and interests should be ranked.’ The
court then explained that ‘protecting human dignity and physical property is more
important than protecting pure economic interests; pure economic interests should
be protected, only if strict conditions can be satisfied.’ According to the court, these
conditions include: (1) whether the defendant acted intentionally or negligently;
34 SeeChongqingshi qianjiangquminzu yiyuan vChongqingshi qianjiangqu yong’an jianzhu youxian
zeren gongsi & Chongqingshi qianjiangqu gongdian youxian zeren gongsi caichan sunhai peichang
jiufen’an (Chongqing Minzu Hospital v Chongqing Yong’an Construction Co, Ltd et al) (26 December
2005) Chongqing No 4 Interim People’s Court (Court of Second Instance).
35 TheGPCL is thebasic lawoncivilmatters,but the 1996ElectricPowerLaw isa special lawwhich
regulates the activities of the electric power industry. Note that in China, a distinction is made
between basic laws (jiben falü) and special laws (tebie falü). The former refers to the statutes that
fundamentally affect the entire society whereas the latter refer to those statutes that only have an
effect in a particular area. More information on the difference between basic and special laws in
China is provided by TW Simon/C Feng/LP Nelson, China’s Changing Legal System: Lawyers &
Judges on Civil & Criminal law (2016) 13; and JF Chen, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation
(2008) 242.
36 The 1996 Electric Power Lawwas enacted by the Standing Committee of the NPC and came into
effect on 1 April 1996.
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(2) whether the plaintiff has obligations to tolerate the interference, taking the
position of a neutral person; and (3) whether allowing the plaintiff’s claim will
impose an excessive financial burden on the defendant (the floodgate concern).37
In this cable case, the court decided that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
recover its loss of profits, not only because ‘the defendant caused the harm through
negligence’, but also because ‘the duration of the power cut was short (which is
tolerable)’ and ‘the fear that widespread liability would place an excessive financial
burden upon the defendant, would be unfair and unjust, and impose burdens upon
the entire economy.’ Here, the main legal bases are arts 5, 106, and 117 of the
GPCL.38
In addition to all these arguments, the court of second instance also pointed
out that the plaintiff cannot claim compensation of its losses because its ‘right to
business’ (ying ye quan) has been violated.39 According to the court, to violate this
right, the defendant’s act should be directed ‘particularly against the plaintiff and
directly affect the plaintiff’s business activities’. In this cable case, however, the
defendant’s act affected not only the plaintiff but also other households and cus-
tomers who live near the scene of the incident. Therefore, the court decided that
the violation of the right to business cannot be invoked by the plaintiff to recover
its loss of profits.
37 Though not always noticed, the court here mentioned only one strand of the floodgate argu-
ment. The other two strands are: (1) the fear that allowing recovery of pure economic loss would
unleash a wave of actions that could overwhelm the courts; and (2) the belief that permitting the
recoveryof pure economic lossmayencourage resistance to the trend towardexpansionof liability.
See VV Palmer/M Bussani, The Present Study, in: VV Palmer/M Bussani (eds), Pure Economic
Loss: New Horizons in Comparative Law (2009) 25–27. See also an editorial by J Spier (ed)/C von
Bar, The Limits of Expanding Liability: Eight Fundamental Cases in a Comparative Perspective
(1998) for a more detailed discussion of the negative effects of expanding liability and the techni-
ques used in different countries to limit such an expansion.
38 Art 5 of the GPCL states that: ‘the lawful civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons
shall be protected by law; no organisation or individual may infringe upon them.’ Art 106 of the
GPCL requires that: ‘citizens and legal persons who breach a contract or fail to fulfil other obliga-
tions shall bear civil liability.’Art 117 of theGPCL reads as follows: ‘Anyonewhodamages theprop-
erty of the State, a collective or another person shall restore the property to its original condition or
reimburse its estimated price. If the victim suffers other great losses therefrom, the infringer shall
compensate those losses as well.’
39 In Germany, the Supreme Court also created the ‘right to business’ to provide a bettermeans of
obtaining compensation for pure economic loss based on negligent conduct. A more detailed dis-
cussion of this right is provided by JM van Dunné, Liability for Pure Economic Loss: Rule or Excep-
tion–A Comparatist’sViewof theCivil Law–CommonLawSplit onCompensationofNon-Physical
Damage in Tort Law (1999) 7 EuropeanReview of Private Law 397, 397–428; see also vanDam (fn 1)
88 f.
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Lastly, note that the court of first instance cited art 60 of the 1196 Electric
Power Law as the legal basis for granting compensation for pure economic loss,
whereas the court of second instance held that this article should not be applied
because, pursuant to this article, ‘the damage suffered by the victim’ should be
limited to ‘personal injury and damage to physical property’ (excluding pure eco-
nomic loss from the category). Based on this interpretation, the court of second
instance decided that art 60 of the 1996 Electric Power Law should not be applied,
as the victim only suffered pure economic loss rather than personal injury or
property loss.
E Case Five: transferred loss cases
The phrase ‘transferred loss’ refers to situations where C causes damage to B or
B’s property, but a special relationship between A and B (or the law itself) trans-
fers a loss that would ordinarily be B’s onto A. One common example of such loss
is a personal injury case. In cases of personal injury or death, spouses and chil-
dren are often granted certain forms of compensation for the loss of financial sup-
port (ie costs related to nursing and living expenses for dependents) and some-
times for non-pecuniary loss (ie pain and suffering), on the grounds of art 119 of
the GPCL and the judicial interpretation issued by the SPC.40 Apparently, the
losses suffered by the injured person’s spouses and children are purely financial,
as they have suffered no previous injuries.
Another common example of a transferred loss case is when an employee is
injured by a third person (the injurer) and is unable to work for a certain period.
Article 11 of the 2004 SPC Interpretation on How to Deal with Personal Injury
Compensation Claims states that:
....where an employee suffers a personal injury when carrying out an employment activity,
the employer shall bear the liability for compensation. If a third person outwith the employ-
ment relationship causes personal injury to the employee, the compensation claim should
be made against either the third person or the employer. The employer may, after being held
liable to pay compensation, claim compensation from the third person... The present Article
shall not apply to labour relationships or work-related injury insurance, which should be
governed by the Regulation on Work-Related Injury Insurance.
40 See art 119 of theGPCL. Seealso arts 17, 21, 22, 23, 27 and 28of 2004 the Interpretation of the SPC
onHow to Deal with Personal Injury Compensation Claims.
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Apparently, according to this provision, the employer in China is allowed to re-
cover from the injurer the compensation that it has paid to the injured employee if
the employer has not joined the Work-Related Insurance (WII) Scheme.41 Note
that if the employer is required to join the WII Scheme by law but fails to do so, it
will not be allowed to recover the compensation. An illustrative example is a case
where a worker, Mr Feng, was injured in a traffic accident that was caused by
Mr Tang.42 The accident occurred in the course of Mr Feng’s work, but Mr Feng’s
employer had not taken out WII cover for him (even though the law requires this
to be done). As a result, the employer itself has to bear the medical expenses,
nursing costs, and the loss of salary that were incurred by Mr Feng. After the pay-
ment of these amounts, Mr Feng’s employer initiated a claim against the actual
injurer, asking the injurer to reimburse the compensation that it had paid to its
injured worker. The claim was denied by the court, because the court deemed that
the losses suffered by the employer actually resulted from the failure to take out
WII. Given this fact, the court decided that allowing the employer to claim com-
pensation from the injurer goes against the aim of the WII scheme, as the employ-
er is supposed to join the WII scheme. If the employer’s claim were allowed, it
would not have to bear the risk of being uninsured and would have no incentive
to join the WII Scheme.
III A summary of the case study results
What can we learn from the results contained in the judicial decisions? First, the
case studies presented in section II show that even though almost all courts admit
the recovery of intentionally caused pure economic loss,43 the legal basis that they
used to arrive at these decisions is quite varied (see Table 1).
41 Note that, in China, if the employee’s injury occurred in the course of work, their loss is often
covered by the Work-Related Injury Insurance (WII). In China, the WII is solely funded by the em-
ployer at a rate of 0.5 %, 1 %, or 2 % of its payroll, depending on the health and safety risk of the
employee’s work. The coverage under WII is normally paid regardless of the insured’s fault, but
pain and suffering is excluded from theWII coverage. See art 38 of the 2011 Social Insurance Law.
42 Available at <http://hbqfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3677> (visited on 20 May
2019).
43 The court’s reasoning in Case one (‘unfair competition’), Case two (‘flawed professional advice
or services’), Case three (‘interference with business’), and Case four (‘cable cases’) all reflect the
idea thatpureeconomic loss is recoverable if it is intentionally inflictedby thedefendant. Seeabove
subsections II.A and II.B.
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Table 1: Legal Basis for the Recovery of Pure Economic Loss Used by Chinese Courts in Different
Cases
Basis in Laws Basis in SPC’s Interpretation
Case One (‘unfair competition’) – Arts 4, 5, and 7 of the GPCL
Case Two (‘flawed professional
advice or services’)
– Art 106 of the GPCL
– Art 49 of 1996 Lawyer’s Law
– Arts 42, 54 of 1993 Law on
Certificated Public Accountant
– Arts 57 and 58 of 1993
Product Quality Law
– Art 44 of 2006 Agricultural
Product Quality Safety Law
– Art 43 of 2006 Notary Law
– Art 207 of 2006 Company
Law
– Art 72 of 2016 Seed Law
– Art 21 of1993 Interim
Provisions on the Management
of the Issuing and Trading of
Stocks
– Art 27 of 2003 Some
Provisions of the SPC on
Trying Cases of Civil
Compensation Arising from
False Statements in Securities
Market
– 1997 Reply of the SPC on
How to Divide the Loss
Suffered by Multiple Creditors
Among Verification
Organizations
– 1998 Reply of the SPC on the
Liability of Accounting Firms If
They Issued False Capital
Verification Certificate to
Enterprises
– Arts 2 and 4 of 2007 Several
Provisions of the SPC on the
Trial of Compensation Cases
for Civil Tort Involving
Accounting Firms Engaging in
the Audit Business
Case Three (‘interference with
business’)
– Arts 5, 106, 117 of the GPCL
– Art 6 of the TLL
Case Four (‘cable case’) – Arts 5, 106, 117 of the GPCL
Case Five (‘transferred loss’) – Art 119 of the GPCL – Arts 11, 17, 21–23, 27, 28 of
the 2004 SPC Interpretation on
How to Deal with Personal
Injury Compensation Claims
As shown in the Table, arts 5 and 106 of the GPCL are often employed by courts as
the main legal basis for awarding compensation in cases of intentionally caused
pure economic loss. However, these two articles are relatively vague. The former
provides the general basis for protecting legal rights and interests, while the latter
is normally considered as the general rule for fault liability. Therefore, it seems
that, in China, cases of intentionally inflicted pure economic loss are in practice
normally resolved through the general rule of negligence. These articles also im-
ply that pure economic loss is recoverable in China if a legally protected right or
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interest has been violated44 and if the violation is committed intentionally or with
fault.45
Moreover, the court’s reasoning in Case three (‘interference with business’)
further implies that it may not be easy for the plaintiff to satisfy the burden of
proof in cases of intentionally caused pure economic loss. To meet the standards
of proof required by the court, the plaintiff has to show that his/her legally pro-
tected right or interest has been violated and that pure economic loss was foresee-
able for the defendant.46 Therefore, it seems that, in China, intentionally inflicted
pure economic loss is recoverable in cases where such a loss was foreseeable, the
conduct in question is regarded as culpable, and a legally acknowledged right or
interest has been violated.
When it comes to cases of negligently caused pure economic loss, courts in
China, either explicitly or implicitly, seem to hold that such a loss is in principle
not recoverable. However, there are two exceptions. In these exceptional circum-
stances, the recovery of pure economic loss is normally due to the presence of a
specific statute (or the presence of an interpretation issued by the SPC) rather than
to the general tort rules in the GPCL or in the TLL (see Table 1).
The first exception arises in cases where the plaintiff’s loss is caused by cer-
tain types of gross negligence by professionals, such as lawyers, notaries, accoun-
tants, and professionals who undertake asset valuation and capital verification.47
As shown in Wang Baofu v Beijing Sanxin Law Firm and China Southern Airlines
Travel & Tourists Company v Yulong Travel Agency et al, people who render profes-
sional advice or services will be responsible for the pure economic loss of third
parties with whom they had no direct contractual tie, provided that they acted
44 The argument that legally acknowledged rights should be protected differently is well estab-
lished in the Germanic legal tradition. For an overview of this tradition, seeWV Gerven, Of Rights,
Remedies andProcedures (2000) 37 CommonMarket LawRev 501, 187 ff; and vanBoom (fn 2) 7–10.
45 All European jurisdictions studied in Bussani/Palmer (fn 7) permit recovery when pure eco-
nomic loss is inflicted intentionally. The reason is that in such situations, the conduct in question
is culpable, immoral or contrary to public policy. Moreover, the recovery of intentionally inflicted
pure economic loss is also allowed in other non-European legal systems, eg Japan, the United
States, Israel, and South Africa. For full details of these legal systems, see the analysis of Y Nomi,
Japan, in: VV Palmer/M Bussani (eds), Pure Economic Loss: New Horizons in Comparative Law
(2009) 71–87; D Gruning, The United States, in: VV Palmer/M Bussani (eds), Pure Economic Loss:
New Horizons in Comparative Law (2009) 134–165; T Gidron/B Shnoor, Israel, in: VV Palmer/
M Bussani (eds), Pure Economic Loss: New Horizons in Comparative Law (2009) 186; and
MM Loubser, South Africa, in: VV Palmer/M Bussani (eds), Pure Economic Loss: New Horizons in
Comparative Law (2009) 218.
46 See above subsections II.B and II.C.
47 See Case two, which is discussed in subsection II.B.
302 Yu Yan and Michael Faure
with gross negligence and that the third party reasonably relied on their profes-
sional services or advice.48 In fact, pure economic loss caused by experts or pro-
fessional organisations is relatively well recognised in China.49 This seems to re-
flect the collective view that a high standard of professional services ought to be
maintained on the market.50
Another exception is the ‘transferred economic loss’ case (Case five).51 Courts
in China may compensate the injured person’s family members for the reasonable
value of care that they rendered to the injured person. The court may also protect
the employer (via the recourse right) who is forced to continue paying an injured
worker’s salary without receiving any work in return. In both situations, the in-
jured person’s loss has been transferred, by statute or by contract, to their family
members or employers. Even though the legislators do not specify why the recov-
ery of transferred economic loss is allowed in China, the existing literature ap-
pears to suggest that the recovery might be justified for two reasons. One is that
rejecting the recovery of ‘transferred economic loss’ that is suffered by the second-
ary victim will release the tortfeasor from liability, with the result that he/she
benefits from his/her illegal behaviour.52 Another reason is perhaps that cases
48 Ibid.
49 See arts 57 and 58 of the 1993 Product Quality Law; art 44 of the 2006 Agricultural Product
QualitySafetyLaw;andart 72of the 2016SeedLaw.Thesearticlesmake it clear thatany institutions
or organisationswhich fabricate certificates or proof concerning the quality of a product (including
the daily-used and agriculture product) that causes losses to the consumers shall be liable to pay
compensation. See also art 54 of the 1996 Lawyer’s Law; arts 2 and 4 of the 2007 Several Provisions
of theSPCon theTrial of CompensationCases forCivil Tort InvolvingAccountingFirmsEngaging in
the Audit Business; art 43 of the 2006 Notary Law; and art 207 of the 2006 Company Law. These
articles clarify that for lawyers, accountants,notaries, andotherprofessionalswhoundertakeasset
valuation, capital or other verifications, liability to pay compensationmaybe imposed if they acted
with intent and gross negligence. More information on these articles can also be found at Zhang
(fn 14) 468–472.
50 There is a consensus among many legal systems that a high standard of professional services
could and ought to bemaintained. Bussani and Palmer’s comparative comments on the ‘poor legal
services case’ (case 14), ‘auditor’s liability case’ (case 17) and ‘an anonymous telephone call case’
(case 20) referred to this collective consensus. See M Bussani/VV Palmer, The Case Studies: Na-
tional Reporters and Editors Commentary, in: M Bussani/VV Palmer (eds), Pure Economic Loss in
Europe (Cambridge University Press 2003) 417, 471, and 519. However, among different legal sys-
tems, some may emphasise specific requirements in those cases (eg the third party is required to
show its reliance on the professional services or advice),whereas others donot clearly impose such
requirements.
51 See above subsection II.E.
52 See C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (1998) 510 f who argues that liability for
transferred loss is aimed at preventing someone appealing to rules whose purpose is not to protect
that person, but to protect others.
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involving such a loss are ‘liability neutral’ from the tortfeasor’s perspective, as
long as the full social cost of the accident is borne by the tortfeasor and there is
no duplication of liability for the same loss.53
Lastly, the foregoing case analysis also shows that Chinese law lacks clear
rules regarding pure economic loss in general (except in cases of ‘flawed profes-
sional services’ and ‘transferred economic loss’). However, Chinese courts (often
via the guiding case project) have developed certain techniques or requirements
to determine the recovery of such loss in practice. For example, in Chongqing Min-
zu Hospital v Chongqing Yong’an Construction Co, Ltd et al, the court explicitly
referred to the floodgates argument as well as to the argument concerning the
ranking of all rights and interests protected by tort law and the claimant’s obliga-
tion to tolerate the interference when denying the recovery of pure economic
loss.54 In Shanghai Lanqi Telecommunication Equipment Co, Ltd v Shanghai Yang-
pu Digital Market Management Co, Ltd (Case three), the court developed the fore-
seeability test and implicitly expressed the fear that allowing recovery would ex-
pose the defendant ‘to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class’.55
IV Re-thinking the current Chinese approach
At first glance, China appears to support awarding compensation for pure eco-
nomic loss, as arts 5 and 106 of the GPCL, as well as art 6 of the TLL are very
general and comprehensive. However, the foregoing analysis shows that the prac-
tice of the Chinese courts adopts a more intermediate or even a conservative posi-
tion. Table 2 below summarises the results of the cases that were studied in the
previous sections.56 The results are divided into two categories: a ‘Yes’means that
compensation for pure economic loss would be granted; a ‘No’ means that com-
53 See Bussani/Palmer (fn 2) 11 f.
54 See Case four which is discussed in subsection II.D.
55 See Case three in subsection II. C. See also Yongkang Liangda Electronics Factory v Yongang
Ruiying Industry and Trade et al, which is discussed in subsection II. C. The ‘indeterminacy’ argu-
ment was originally proposed by an American judge, Cardozo, in the famous Ultramares case. In
this case, the judge held that negligent accountants should not be liable to compensate damage
suffered by third parties, because theywould be exposed to a liability ‘in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’. See Ultramares Corp v Touche (1931) 255 New
York Reports (NY) 170, 174.
56 In the table, case numbers can be read as follows: Case 1 (unfair compensation case); Case 2
(flawed professional services or advice case); Case 3 (interference with business case); Case 4
(cable case); Case 5 (transferred loss case).
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pensation for such loss would be denied. Moreover, a distinction is also made
between cases where the recovery can be attained in tort or by specific statute.
As shown in the Table, in cases where the loss is intentionally inflicted, com-
pensation will always be awarded. However, certain requirements must be met,
eg the defendant has to be culpable, the loss has to have been foreseeable, and
protected rights or interests have been violated.57 The rationale for recovery in
such cases is straightforward. Denying recovery would create incentives for a tort-
feasor acting with intent to cause a pure economic loss to the victim. Conse-
quently, a third party, who would not have to face any tortious liability, could
benefit from a rule of no recovery.58





Yes (general tort rules) 1; 3; 4; 5 5
Yes (specific statute) 1 (after 1993, when the 1003
Unfair Competition Law was
enacted); 2
2
No 1; 3; 4
Table 2 also shows that in cases where the loss was negligently caused, courts in
China often proceed from an exclusionary position: the recovery of pure economic
loss is in principle not allowed, except in defined and limited circumstances, such
as the transferred loss and the flawed professional services cases. Moreover, for
cases where the recovery of pure economic loss is denied, Chinese courts have
developed several arguments, such as the threat of opening ‘floodgates’, the rank-
ing of rights and interests, and the uncertainty/unforeseeability concern to sup-
port their decision.59 In the following subsections, the current Chinese approach
as well as the arguments that are used to deny compensation for pure economic
loss will be critically analysed.
57 See above section III.
58 See F Parisi/VV Palmer/M Bussani, The Comparative Law and Economics of Pure Economic
Loss (2007) 27 International Rev of Law Economics 29, 46.
59 See above section III.
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A Rationale of the arguments for denying recovery
As mentioned before, in cases of negligently inflicted pure economic loss, Chinese
courts often proceed from an exclusionary position and set out several arguments
in support of denying compensation.60
The first line of argument is often grounded on the belief that allowing recov-
ery would cause problems of open-ended liability and derivative litigation (often
referred to as the floodgate problems). For instance, in Case four (‘cable case’),
the court of second instance clearly fears that permitting recovery would over-
whelm courts and place an excessive financial burden upon the defendant.61
Some scholars argue that such fear makes sense, as derivative litigation would
increase the administrative costs of the legal system, which ultimately increases
the total social costs of accidents.62 However, from a scientific or a comparative
point of view, the derivate litigation argument lacks justification. Empirically,
there is a lack of solid evidence to prove that derivative litigation will actually
follow in practice. If we take a look at the liberal regimes in Europe (eg France)
where there is a broad recoverability of pure economic loss, it has to be admitted
that these countries are not flooded with such claims.63 When it comes to the
problem of open-ended liability, it should be stressed that not all pure economic
loss cases pose an excessive burden on the tortfeasor’s limited assets.64 For in-
stance, in Case five (‘transferred loss case’), the open-ended liability problem
does not exist whereas in other relational pure economic loss cases (eg Case four,
‘cable case’), the tortfeasor may face the real risk of unbearable financial conse-
quences.65 Additionally, many instances of physical losses seem to cause even
greater floodgate problems, but their compensation is not questioned.66 All these
facts may, to a certain extent, help to explain why liberal regimes in Europe are
not flooded with pure economic loss claims. Just as some studies have argued,
although these regimes generously allow such claims in practice, the extent of
liability is largely limited by implementing various legal instruments, eg require-
60 See above subsections II.B, II.C, and II.D.
61 See above subsection II.D.
62 See Palmer/Bussani (fn 37) 31.
63 See J Spier/O Haazen, Preliminary Observations, in: J Spier (ed), The Limits of Expanding Lia-
bility: Eight Fundamental Cases in a Comparative Perspective (1998) 7.
64 See Fleming James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Prag-
matic Appraisal (1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law (New Series) 105, 115.
65 See above subsection II.D.
66 See M Bussani/VV Palmer/F Parisi, Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic
Restatement (2003) 51 AJCL 113, 113–162 for a critical discussion of the floodgate arguments.
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ments concerning causation, proof of damage, and the duty of the victim to miti-
gate damage.67
The ranking of legal rights and interests argument is a second line of argu-
ment that is often used by Chinese courts to deny the recovery of pure economic
loss (eg in Case four). According to this argument, there is a necessity to weigh
human values against legal rights, and pure economic interests are said to occupy
levels below bodily integrity and property.68 Such argument seems to rest upon a
premise that compensation is a scarce commodity and the law cannot simulta-
neously protect all values fully.69 This premise is not very convincing.70 On the
one hand, in some cases, the consequences of cases of pure economic loss can be
very devastating, just as the consequences of personal injury and death cases. On
the other hand, there is no empirical support for the assumption that the limits of
compensation have ever been reached.71 Therefore, it seems that the ranking of
legal rights and interests argument cannot be, or at least cannot be the only rea-
son for fully barring recovery of pure economic loss.72 For example, this argument
cannot explain why intentionally inflicted pure economic loss and consequential
economic loss are recoverable in most jurisdictions.73 In fact, the denial of com-
67 See Spier/Haazen (fn 63) 12. See alsoM Barendrecht, Pure Economic Loss in the Netherlands,
in: E Hondius (ed), Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative
Law (1998) 126. For example, the courts in the Netherlands are allowed to reduce the amount in
damages whenever full compensation would lead to clearly unacceptable results such as bank-
ruptcy of the debtor. See art 6: 109 BW. On the compensation of pure economic loss in the Nether-
lands, see Bussani/Palmer (fn 3) 139–147.
68 The fact that there is a deep-seated preference for the protection of property interests over and
above pure economic interests in tort law iswell recognised in the literature. However, the existing
justifications of such a preference are found to be either ad hoc in nature or of limited explanatory
power. See C Witting, Distinguishing between Property Damage and Pure Economic Loss in Negli-
gence: A Personality Thesis (2001) 21 Legal Studies (LS) 481, 481–514 for a detailed examination of
the justifications for the ranking of legal rights and interests argument.
69 See van Boom (fn 2) 46–48.
70 One possible justification for the ranking of legal rights and interests argumentmay rest on the
basis of Hegel’s ‘personality thesis’. This means that ‘although wealth permits the acquisition of
property and participation in activities and experiences which may help to constitute and define
the self in the future, themere fact thatwealth hasnot been transposed into these things excludes it
from being considered as important as actual holdings of property.’ SeeWitting (2001) 21 LS 481,
505–513.
71 Ibid.
72 Just as vanBoom (fn 2) 44–46 suggested,amoderncivil codeormodern tort lawshould respond
to the development of intangible wealth and the growing public awareness of protecting purely
economic interests. Therefore, the more modern view of tort law would not be to fundamentally
treat life, health, and property differently from pure economic interests.
73 See J DeMot, Pure Economic Loss, in: M Faure (ed), Tort Law and Economics (2009) 203.
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pensation for pure economic loss is often interrelated with many other factors,
such as the extent to which the damage could be foreseen, or the tortfeasor
blamed, or the size of the plaintiff class, or the public policy toward professional
standards could be assessed, and so forth. Therefore, it seems that when addres-
sing the recoverability of pure economic loss, an appropriate approach for policy-
makers is to carefully consider all these factors rather than simply the ranking of
legal rights and interests.74
A third set of arguments refers to the concern that permitting the recovery of
pure economic loss will cause ‘indeterminacy’ concerns, as such cases involve an
unknown number of potential victims, an uncertain amount of loss, and cases
which are unforeseeable in nature.75 This argument is partially correct if we con-
sider the fact that tort cases often involve strangers and that these parties cannot
have the opportunity (as they do in contract cases) to ex ante assess the number,
the nature, and the extent of possible pure economic claims. However, this argu-
ment neglects the fact that in certain pure economic loss cases, the indeterminacy
problem does not exist. For example, in cases of ‘unfair competition’ (Case one)
and ‘transferred loss’ (Case five), the number of potential victims as well as the
likelihood of the damage are ex ante calculable. Moreover, it is still debated
whether there is a wider range of victims and a wider extent of claims in pure
economic loss cases than in cases of personal injury and property damage. Given
all these facts, it can be concluded that the ‘indeterminacy’ argument holds only
for certain types of pure economic loss cases (eg the ‘cable case’). The application
of this argument seems therefore to depend on the nature of the loss.
B A view from law and economics
As shown in the above section, arguments seeking to justify the denial of pure
economic loss in China are largely debated and may even lead to practical incon-
sistencies.76 Due to this fact, in this subsection we turn to the law and economics
74 See van Boom (fn 2) 46–48. For example, cases studies in section 2 show that courts in China
may reject theclaim forpureeconomic loss, basedon theuncertaintyorunforeseeabilityof the loss.
See above subsections II.C and II.D.
75 See van Boom (fn 2) 44–46.
76 See Bussani/Palmer/Parisi (2003) 51 AJCL 113, 113–162; G Dari-Mattiacci/HB Schäfer, The Core
of PureEconomic Loss (2007) 27, International Reviewof LawandEconomics (Int’l RevL&Econ) 8,
8–28; andParisi/Palmer/Bussani, 27 Int’l RevL&Econ 29 all argue that traditional explanations (eg
the floodgates argument, the scale of human values argument, and the need to reduce litigation
costs argument) seeking to justify the non-recovery of pure economic loss often lead to practical
inconsistencies.
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analysis and explain how such analysis could act as a tool to guide the recover-
ability of pure economic loss in China.
In the law and economic literature, the starting point is that compensation
should be based on the social loss to provide the tortfeasor with optimal incen-
tives to prevent the loss.77 In cases of pure economic loss, however, the private
loss of the victim might be offset by private gains elsewhere.78 As a result, pure
economic loss is more likely to involve a wealth transfer rather than to cause so-
cial loss. Since some pure economic loss cases involve no social loss, some econ-
omists argue that such loss should not be compensated.79 However, this assertion
is challenged by other studies. The reasons are summarised as follows.
First, some pure economic loss cases do result in a social loss. For example,
the cable case (Case four) often entails the impairment of resources and the in-
creased capacity of the third party, both of which can be regarded as social
losses.80 Moreover, in the flawed professional service case (Case two), there might
also be a social loss, since trust in the information provided by the expert de-
creases and money is sub-optimally invested on the basis of incorrect informa-
tion.81 Therefore, pure economic loss cases that entail those social losses should
be compensated, otherwise the increased capacity of the third party will be in-
flated to an inefficiently high level.82 Consequently, the victim should in principle
be compensated in the negligently caused cable case (Case four), even if no abso-
lute rights are infringed. This is because in such cases, the market price of the
77 See J Arlen, Tort Damages, in: B Bouckaert/GD Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Econom-
ics (1999) 684.
78 SeeW Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort (1982) 2 OJLS 1, 12.
79 The argument was first proposed by Bishop (1982) 2 OJLS 1, 1–29; and then developed bymany
subsequent works. See eg S Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987) 135 ff;WM Landes/
RA Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987) 251 ff; F Gómez/JA Ruiz, The Plural-andMis-
leading:NotionofEconomicLoss inTort:A LawandEconomicsPerspective (2004) 12Zeitschrift für
Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 908, 908–1031; and HB Schäfer/C Ott/M Braham, The Economic
Analysis of Civil Law (2005) 301.
80 The impairment of resources involves social loss, as valuable resources cannot be used for a
limited period of time, decreasing the utility that individuals derive from the recourses’ uses. The
wealth transfer from the tortfeasor to the third party comes at the cost of increased capacity. This
increased capacity of the third party can be considered as a precaution cost, as the third party is
provided with a valuable way to mitigate the total loss and such mitigation effort has a cost. See
Dari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 15–17.
81 See L Visscher, Tort Damages, in: M Faure (ed), Tort Law and Economics (2009) 169.
82 Moreover, Dari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 17 further argue that if a third
party has mitigated the accident loss, the compensation should equal the mitigation cost (eg the
cost of repair, the cost of finding substitute goods or service) instead of the initial loss (the total
reduction in the value of the goods or the service impaired).
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damaged cable cannot be assumed to capture the full surplus that the third par-
ties obtain from its use.83 Hence, if liability is limited to the losses of the hospital,
compensation would be lower than the social losses of the accident, causing the
tortfeasor to take less than an optimal level of care.
Second, the wealth transfer argument presented above is grounded on an
unrealistic assumption that substitute goods or services are readily available on
the market at no cost.84 In reality, however, third parties will make gains only if
they have excessive capacity to increase their production or provision of services.
Such over-capacity might be inefficient in the first place, because if it is not uti-
lised, the resources remain idle.85 Moreover, not compensating pure economic
loss may also result in more over-capacity being needed, as there will be less
liability and more accidents.86
Third, pure economic loss should even be compensated in some cases where
it does not correspond to any social loss, on the condition that the third parties are
willing to pay (or have actually paid) for protection against an involuntary wealth
transfer.87 For example, in the flawed professional service or advice case (Case
two), a lawyer or a notary is usually hired by the victim. The services or advice
provided by these professionals usually exclusively benefit the victim or a limited
group of third parties (eg the victim’s heir or other intended beneficiaries). Since
the price of services incorporates the expected liability of the expert, the victim is
paying ex ante the price for an implicit warranty of the quality of the professional
service. Therefore, even if the victimised parties have no contractual relationship
with the expert, the liability risk of the expert remains the same and compensa-
tion for these parties’ pure economic loss should still be paid. By contrast, in cases
where the victim’s private loss is higher than the social loss and the liability costs
are not internalised in the price (because the victim is not willing to pay or for
other reasons), compensation for pure economic loss should be restricted or de-
nied.88 Otherwise, there will be a free-rider problem on the part of the victim. For
example, in a flawed professional service case (Case two), we assume that an
accountant or an auditor is hired by a client. Due to the nature of the services
provided, the information provided by the accountant or the auditor may benefit
83 SeeDeMot (fn 73) 209.
84 SeeMJ Rizzo, The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop (1982) 2 OJLS 197, 198 f.
85 See ibid; see alsoBishop (1982) 2 OJLS 1, 5. Even though both articles agree that in cases of pure
economic loss there is some unused capacity, their opinions diverge on whether this capacity is
inefficient.
86 See Rizzo (1982) 2 OJLS 197, 202 andVisscher (fn 81) 168.
87 SeeDari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 18–20; see alsoDeMot (fn 73) 210 f.
88 SeeDari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 20–22; see alsoDeMot (fn 73) 210 f.
310 Yu Yan and Michael Faure
more individuals (eg third party investors and financial institutions). If third par-
ties other than the client (or his/her intended beneficiaries) can rely on the infor-
mation and claim compensation without contributing to the cost of the service,
the client would pay for the larger potential cost of liability. In turn, this would
lead to a sub-optimal demand for professional services and an excessive expan-
sion of the tortfeasor’s exposure to liability.
From an economic point of view, it seems to be unconvincing to determine
the compensation of pure economic loss solely on the basis of social loss. This is
perhaps the reason why some economists are beginning to argue that the problem
of pure economic loss actually originates from the fact that tort law is used to
accomplish duplicate tasks, the internalisation of both negative and positive ex-
ternalities.89 In an ideal word where both negative liability and positive liability
could be used (a framework of decoupled liability),90 those who have suffered
injury should be incentivised to act optimally, while victims and third parties
should be incentivised to maintain optimal over-capacity. However, such a de-
coupling system is rarely implemented in reality, and legal systems normally rely
on different forms of the negligence rule to determine the recovery of pure eco-
nomic loss. From this premise, it is argued that to determine the recoverability of
such loss, one has to take into account not only the magnitude of the damages
award (eg whether compensation should include the victim’s private loss or
should be limited to the socially relevant loss), but also other elements of the legal
system (eg the scope of the negligence rule, the implementation of subsidies and
other incentive devices).91
V Conclusions and directions for the future
In this article, we have re-examined the way in which Chinese legislators and
courts have developed to cope with cases of pure economic loss. We have shown
that the legal basis used to determine the recovery of pure economic loss in China
is often unclear, and that the courts have developed a relatively conservative atti-
tude towards the compensation of such loss in practice.92 Moreover, our analyses
89 SeeG Dari-Mattiacci, The Economics of Pure Economic Loss and the Internalisation ofMultiple
Externalities, in:W van Boom/H Koziol/C Witting (eds), Pure Economic Loss (2004) 175 ff.
90 This means that the injurer is liable for the pure economic loss but is compensated for the ben-
efits of third parties; the victim is not compensated for pure economic loss but is compensated for
benefits of third parties, and the third parties are allowed to keep their benefits. Ibid, 176.
91 Ibid, 188.
92 See above section III.
Pure Economic Loss in China 311
have also showed that the arguments (eg floodgate, ranking of legal rights and
interests, and indeterminacy arguments) adopted by Chinese courts to deny re-
covery are neither fair nor reasonable.93 They normally lack scientific or compara-
tive support and can only be used to deny compensation in a limited type of cases.
Due to these problems, this article further turned to the law and economics litera-
ture to seek complementary solutions.94 According to such analyses, the tortfea-
sor should not be excluded from the duty to compensate merely on the basis of
the nature of the damage he/she caused, but on the social loss generated.95 Fully
excluding the recovery of pure economic loss not only leaves the victim with less
than full compensation but also reduces the tortfeasor’s incentives to avoid dam-
age.96 Following this line of analysis, we suggest that socially relevant losses in
cases of pure economic loss should be compensated. Since both the impairment
of resources and the increased capacities used to substitute impaired resources
can be regarded as a social cost, these losses should also be taken into account
when calculating the amount of pure economic loss. In addition, in cases where
pure economic loss does not correspond to a social loss, such a loss should also
be compensated if third parties are willing to pay or have paid for protection
against such loss.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the authors advocate a broader scope of
recovery of pure economic loss. What we really suggest is that the recoverability
of pure economic loss is a complex issue and should never be resolved with a
simple solution.97 As a matter of fact, legislators and courts in China should take
note of the fact that pure economic loss often arises at the end of a long chain of
events. Thus, certain legal concepts, such as causation and the duty of the victim
to mitigate damage, need to be further clarified and more carefully designed in
the future to cut this chain at some point.98 Furthermore, when determining the
extent of pure economic loss, the legislators or courts in China should cautiously
93 See above subsection IV.A.
94 See above subsection IV.B.
95 See van Boom (fn 2) 48.
96 See above subsection IV.B.
97 In this view, some of the suggestions that scholars have made seem to be simplistic and may
only be applicable in the common law systems. For example, Barker ([2006] 26 OJLS 289, 289–302)
argues that the House of Lords should endorse a single reasoning strategy to pure economic loss
cases based on the three-stage approach in the Caparo case. P Giliker, Revisiting pure economic
loss: lessons to be learnt from the Supreme Court of Canada? (2005) 25 LS 49, 49–71 proposes that
courts in the UK should adopt the ‘categorization approach’, developed by Canadian courts, to-
wards pure economic loss claims.
98 Van Boom (fn 2) 48–52 and Dari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 25 f also sug-
gest the causation requirement could act as a ‘safety valve’ to relieve the excessive pressure im-
312 Yu Yan and Michael Faure
balance a variety of factors, including but not limited to, the extent to which the
damage could have been foreseen, the nature of the loss, the extent to which the
tortfeasor is culpable, the size of the plaintiff class, the public policy toward pro-
fessional standards, the victim’s private loss, the social loss, the courts’ capacities
to calculate the loss,99 and the willingness of third parties to pay for protection
against the loss. Therefore, the final decisions on whether the recovery of pure
economic loss should be allowed in a particular case ought to be based upon a
balanced approach, taking into account a trade-off between all these factors.
posed by the compensation for pure economic loss. The latter study further adds that the never-
ending chain is not a problem of pure economic loss alone; it is amore general problem.
99 Van Boom (fn 2) 48–52 suggests that the court should be endowed with the power to reduce
compensation for pure economic loss when full compensation would certainly lead to unaccepta-
ble results. Dari-Mattiacci/Schäfer (2007) 27 Int’l Rev L & Econ 8, 25 f however, mention that many
legal systems exclude sentimental value or non-physical pain from compensation, as their calcula-
tionmay overly burden the abilities and capacities of courts.
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